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This  paper  investigates  the  explanatory  and  forecasting  power  of macroeconomic  fundamentals  on
emerging  market  sovereign  credit spreads.  We  pay  special  attention  to  a  new  set  of macroeconomic  fac-
tors related  to market  values  that  reﬂect  investor  expectations  concerning  future  economic  performance.
The model  we  propose  captures  a signiﬁcant  part  of  the  empirical  variation  in  spreads.  Importantly,  it also
includes  a powerful  forecasting  component  that extends  up  to  12  months  outside  the  sample  period.  TheEL classiﬁcation:
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forward-looking  variables  that we construct  are  signiﬁcant  and  complement  and  enhance  the  explanatory
content  of the  conventional  variables  found  in  the  extant  literature.
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. Introduction
This paper examines the explanatory and forecasting power of
orward looking macro variables on sovereign credit spreads. While
ntuition and ﬁnancial theory suggest that these variables should
ffect spreads, they have not been used in this type of study before.
The variables we construct follow Clark and Kassimatis (2011)
hereafter C&K), who have developed a theoretical framework
nd practical methodology for calculating the expected (forward-
ooking) macroeconomic market value of a sovereign country’s
conomy. They show that a value weighted index composed of
he individual country values can be used to generate explana-
ory information, incremental to what is available in traded asset
rices, that is signiﬁcant for explaining individual asset returns
ver an asset universe that includes stocks, bonds, money markets
nd commodities. They also show that the individual macroecono-
ic  market values that they calculate are analogous to the market
alues of private companies quoted on the world’s stock markets.
orporate market values and the information they provide, such as
ates of return and volatility are standard inputs in corporate credit
odels. Following this intuition we follow C&K to estimate the
arket values and rates of return of each economy in our sample.
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +30 2108203923.
E-mail addresses: e.clark@mdx.ac.uk (E. Clark), kkassima@aueb.gr
K. Kassimatis).
1 Tel.: +44 2084115130.
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2015.06.002
572-3089/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article 
/).We  then use this information to construct other macroeconomic
variables analogous to those that ﬁgure in the corporate credit lit-
erature. First, from the country’s rate of return we calculate the
economy’s volatility that we use along with the country’s macro-
economic value in the Merton (1974) structural model to estimate
a theoretical ﬁnancial risk premium for each country. Second, we
estimate the correlation coefﬁcient between returns to the econ-
omy  and exchange rates. This correlation coefﬁcient is a variable
that has been shown to have important explanatory power in the
corporate credit spread literature.2 Finally, we test the relevance
of these forward looking variables for explaining and forecasting
sovereign credit spreads.
In the absence of appropriate forward looking macroeconomic
market values, researchers focusing on fundamentals have had
to rely on proxies to ﬁll the gap. For example, ﬁrm value is an
important variable in the corporate credit literature, but its macro-
economic analog, country market value, which is a relatively recent
innovation, has not been used before. Most studies use GDP or the
change in GDP as a proxy measure for the size and productivity of
a country. Although related to the market value of a country’s pro-
ductive apparatus, GDP is a very imperfect proxy. It is a ﬂow variable
gross of depreciation and provisions for loss that does not distin-
guish between production costs and the value of output, while the
market value of ﬁnancial theory is a stock variable that incorpo-
rates the effects of production costs, output value, depreciation and
2 See, for example, Galai and Wiener (2012).
under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.
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xpected losses. Similarly, besides GDP, the main variables used in
he literature for the effectiveness of a county to generate the for-
ign currency necessary to service the external debt are the trade
alance or the current account balance. While these variables are
elated to the proﬁtability of a country, they provide only a par-
ial and potentially misleading view of a country’s performance.
or example, a country’s proﬁts can be positive when the current
ccount balance is negative and vice versa.3
The innovation of our paper is that we introduce for the ﬁrst
ime a set of macroeconomic variables that ﬁnancial theory sug-
ests should be important determinants of credit risk to explain
overeign credit spreads. The contribution of the paper takes two
irections. First, by using the concept of forward looking macroeco-
omic market values, we have moved the sovereign debt literature
loser to the literature on corporate debt and the ﬁnancial mod-
ls that drive the analysis. Second, we reinforce the evidence that,
n spite of some perceived shortcomings,4 macroeconomic funda-
entals are important determinants of sovereign credit spreads
n emerging markets.5 We  show that when macroeconomic fun-
amentals are correctly speciﬁed they play a more signiﬁcant
ole in the determination of sovereign credit spreads than previ-
usly thought. We  ﬁnd that the new set of macroeconomic factors
elated to market values that reﬂect investor expectations con-
erning future economic performance are statistically signiﬁcant
eterminants of sovereign spreads and their signiﬁcance is robust
o the inclusion of the other conventional macro and ﬁnancial vari-
bles found elsewhere in the literature. Standing alone they explain
ore than 41% of sovereign credit spreads. Combined with other
onventional variables the explanatory power increases to 78%.
oreover, we ﬁnd that they have forecasting power that extends
p to 6 months outside the sample period. The model we  pro-
ose can explain 80% of sovereign spreads six months into the
uture and the new set of macroeconomic factors increases the
ccuracy of predicting large jumps in the spread over a 6 month
orizon.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the lit-
rature on the determinants of sovereign bond yields, Section
 presents the procedure used to derive the new macroeco-
omic factors, Section 4 discusses the data and estimation
ethodology. Section 5 reports our results, which we  discuss in
ection 6.
. Literature review
The empirical literature on sovereign credit spreads considers
ocal and global factors. Local factors can be divided into macroeco-
omic fundamentals and solvency and liquidity factors. We begin
he review of the literature with the local factors.
3 See, for example, Eq. (4) and footnote 9.
4 Much of this literature is related to the behavior of Eurozone countries in the
ecent ﬁnancial crisis. For example, De Grauwe and Ji (2013) ﬁnd that models per-
orm  poorly mainly for Eurozone countries because they cannot issue currency and
hus, cannot guarantee payment of their debt obligations. Dell’Erba et al. (2013) ﬁnd
hat spreads are affected not only by debt levels but debt currency composition as
ell. They argue that Eurozone countries issuing euro-denominated debt effectively
orrow in foreign currency because they have no control over currency issuance. Ang
nd  Longstaff (2013) ﬁnd that there is a systemic component in sovereign credit risk
hat is attributed to ﬁnancial markets rather than fundamentals. Similarly, Arghyrou
nd Kontonikas (2012), and Philippas and Siriopoulos (2013) ﬁnd a contagion effect
n  the Euro sovereign bond market, unrelated to fundamentals, while Janus et al.
2013) ﬁnd that trading in CDSs is driven by heterogeneous investor beliefs and
verconﬁdence.
5 Dell’Erba et al. (2013), for example, ﬁnd that the correlation between spreads
nd  debt levels in foreign currency is much stronger for emerging economies than
dvanced economies.ancial Stability 20 (2015) 1–13
2.1. Local factors
2.1.1. Macroeconomic determinants
Since a higher level of output means improved capacity to
service the economy’s debt, many studies ﬁnd that GDP growth
or some similar activity based indicator is a signiﬁcant deter-
minant of sovereign spreads (e.g. Baek et al., 2005; Beck, 2001;
Gibson et al., 2012; Eichler and Maltritz, 2013). The terms of
trade (i.e. price of exports relative to the price of imports) are
another important determinant of sovereign spreads because they
affect the economy’s capacity to generate the foreign currency
income necessary to service foreign debt (Bulow and Rogoff, 1989).
Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010) empirically examine this relation-
ship and ﬁnd that the terms of trade as well as the volatility of the
terms of trade are signiﬁcant factors affecting sovereign spreads
for 31 emerging economies. Min  (1998), Baldacci et al. (2011)
and Gibson et al. (2012) among others, also report that the terms
of trade have a signiﬁcant, inverse relationship with sovereign
spreads.
The trade balance and the current account balance are more
general measures of the economy’s capacity to generate foreign
income to service the country’s debt. The empirical results on their
effect on sovereign spreads, however, are ambiguous. Eichler and
Maltritz (2013) ﬁnd that the trade balance affects only medium-to-
long term spreads but not short term spreads. They argue that in
the short run, capital inﬂows alleviate solvency problems. However,
a capital account surplus means a current account deﬁcit, which is
why the effect of the current account on spreads is ambiguous. Beck
(2001), counter-intuitively, ﬁnds that current account surpluses are
associated with higher spreads.
Given its well known effects on relative prices, resource alloca-
tion and exchange rates, inﬂation is a source of increased economic
and ﬁnancial uncertainty that can also affect spreads. Min  (1998),
for example, ﬁnds that inﬂation is one of the macro variables driv-
ing spreads for a number of Latin American and Asian countries. He
argues that inﬂation can serve as a proxy for economic management
in the sense that well-managed economies experience low inﬂation
rates. Beck (2001) also ﬁnds that inﬂation is a signiﬁcant determi-
nant of spreads but in his framework it is expected inﬂation that
matters. On the other hand, Diaz and Gemmill (2006) who  examine
the global and local determinants of the creditworthiness of four
Latin American economies, ﬁnd that inﬂation is not a signiﬁcant
determinant of sovereign spreads.
2.1.2. Solvency, Liquidity and other factors
Debt to GDP is the main solvency indicator that ﬁgures
in most empirical studies on the determinants of sovereign
spreads (Hilscher and Nosbusch, 2010; Edwards, 1986; Min, 1998;
Eichengreen and Mody, 2000; Eichler and Maltritz, 2013). The main
liquidity factor is reserves to GDP. Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010),
Min  (1998), Diaz and Gemmill (2006), Baldacci et al. (2011), Cline
and Barnes (1997), among others, ﬁnd that reserves to GDP is a sig-
niﬁcant explanatory variable for sovereign spreads. Other studies,
such as Bandiera et al. (2010), Bernoth et al. (2012), and Min (1998),
use time to maturity as a determinant of a bond’s risk.
Other factors include political risk indicators, currency mis-
matches and default history. For political risk indicators, most
authors consider ratings provided by an agency such as Standard
and Poor’s or the Institutional Investor magazine. Empirical stud-
ies ﬁnd that they add explanatory power beyond that of other
macro variables. For example, Kamin and von Kleist (1999) ﬁnd
that emerging economies with relatively favorable credit ratings,
experience spreads which differ considerably to those with less
favorable ratings. Gonzalez-Rozada and Levy-Yeyati (2008) ﬁnd
that the long-term foreign debt S&P ratings have explanatory power
for spreads in 33 emerging economies. Baldacci et al. (2011) employ
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 measure of political risk which is based on the Heritage Foun-
ation economic freedom index and the World Bank governance
ndex. They also ﬁnd that political risk is an important determinant
f spreads. Elgin and Uras (2013) ﬁnd that the size of the shadow
conomy, which is part of the political risk of a country, is positively
elated to sovereign default risk.
Default history and currency mismatches, the discrepancy
etween the currency composition of a ﬁrm or nation’s assets and
iabilities, ﬁgure prominently as important factors that can lead to
nancial crises, especially in developing countries. Reinhart et al.
2003) argue that a country’s history of default is a key predic-
or of future default because some countries tend to be “serial
efaulters”. Therefore, countries with recent default episodes usu-
lly have higher spreads. Currency mismatches create currency risk
nd can contribute to ﬁnancial crises in ﬁrms as well as countries
e.g. Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2005; Catao and Sutton, 2002;
ufﬁe et al., 2003; Gibson and Sundaresan, 2001; Gray et al., 2007;
avrylyshyn and Beddies, 2003; Hilscher and Nosbusch, 2010;
ongstaff et al., 2011; Diaz and Gemmill, 2006).6
.2. Global factors
Longstaff et al. (2011) ﬁnd that sovereign credit risk is primarily
ffected by global factors rather than domestic factors. The authors
se principal component analysis and ﬁnd that the ﬁrst principal
omponent of monthly sovereign CDS spread changes accounts for
4% of the variation in credit spreads. Westphalen (2002) also ﬁnds
hat a large part of the variation in spreads from 26 economies can
e explained by a single (unidentiﬁed) factor. This ﬁnding suggests
hat variation in spreads is due to systematic factors. Longstaff et al.
2011) report that sovereign credit spreads from 26 economies are
ore related to U.S. stock and high-yield markets and the VIX index
han to local factors such as local equity index returns. However,
he authors note that their sample covers a period of global liquid-
ty where investors reached for high yields. In different periods,
ocal factors may  be more important in explaining sovereign credit
preads. Pan and Singleton (2008), who also document a strong
elationship between sovereign credit risk and the VIX index, ﬁnd
hat in certain periods investors develop a bigger appetite for credit
xposure at a global level. It is during such periods that sovereign
redit spreads co-move the most.
The most commonly used global variables in empirical bond and
DS spread studies are the VIX index, which proxies for volatility in
lobal markets, the yield on a long-term US Treasury bond, which
roxies for changes in the US economy, the default yield spread
eﬁned as the spread between corporate bonds with low and high
redit rating, the returns on a US stock market index, which prox-
es for the global economic condition and the global business cycle,
he TED spread, which proxies for changes in global liquidity, and
n equity risk premium proxy, such as the earnings price ratio
n a stock market index (see, for example, Longstaff et al., 2011;
onzalez-Rozada and Levy-Yeyati, 2008; Hilscher and Nosbusch,
010; Baldacci et al., 2011; Beck, 2001; Eichengreen and Mody,
000).
.3. DiscussionAs comprehensive as this literature is, it suffers from some
mportant shortcomings. The local variables suffer from missing
ariable bias. While the variables used are intuitively appealing,
6 On the relationship between ﬁrms’ rate of return and exchange rate changes,
ee  also: Dominguez and Tesar (2006). Allayannis and Weston (2001) examine the
ffect of the hedging activities of ﬁrms on the ﬁnancial exposure stemming from
oreign currency denominated debt.ancial Stability 20 (2015) 1–13 3
they fail to address the determinants of credit risk reﬂected in
the theoretical models developed in the corporate ﬁnance litera-
ture. Speciﬁcally, in these models the borrower’s capacity to repay
depends to a large extent on his wealth (market value) and its
volatility (return volatility). This is implicit in the reduced form
credit models and explicit in the structural models such as Merton
(1974). Most studies on sovereign credit spreads use GDP as a proxy
for these variables, but for reasons explained in the introduction
of this paper, GDP is not a satisfactory proxy. Multi-currency bor-
rowing is another potential source of omitted variable bias. In a
multicurrency environment, the probability of insolvency and the
costs of ﬁnancing depend on the correlation between the com-
pany’s rate of return and the exchange rate with respect to the
borrowed currency (see Galai and Wiener, 2012). This type of anal-
ysis has been applied empirically on corporations (e.g. Cornell and
Shapiro, 1983; Levich, 2001) but not on sovereigns because up to
now no reliable proxy for country returns has been available. This
paper attempts to ﬁll this gap in the literature by constructing the
relevant variables and testing their relevance to sovereign credit
spreads.
3. Generating the macroeconomic variables
3.1. Market value and annual rate of return
In this section we  follow C&K to estimate macroeconomic mar-
ket value and derive the forward looking macroeconomic variables
to be used in the empirical testing. The forward looking concept
of macroeconomic market value distinguishes between the value
of the economy in local currency and the value of the economy in
foreign currency, i.e. US dollars (USD). The value of the economy
in local currency reﬂects the internal organization of the economy
in question with respect to wages, taxes, subsidies, tariffs, mon-
etary policy, etc. Combined with human and natural resources, it
determines the composition and quantities of what is produced and
consumed. Values measured in local currency reﬂect this organiza-
tion and resource endowment, which may  or may not correspond
to values in other economies or on international markets. This is
analogous to the situation of the individual ﬁrm with its own  set
of resources, wages, internal transfer prices, cross subsidies, etc.,
which determine the composition and quantity of its output and
its inputs.
Assuming that all transactions take place on the ﬁrst day of the
period, C&K have shown that the market value of an open national
economy at time T in local currency, denoted VT, is given by:
VT = (BT − AT ) + E(BT+1 − AT+1)R−1 + · · · + E(Bn − An)R−(n−T) (1)
where Bt is total income for period t from the sale of the economy’s
output of ﬁnal good and services, At is total expenditure for period
t by the economy for the purchase of ﬁnal goods and services and
R = 1 + r, where r is a nominal rate that represents the economy’s
required rate of return.
Similarly, the value of the economy in US  dollars (USD), where
asterisks denote USD, is given by:
V∗T = (B∗T − A∗T ) + E(B∗T+1 − A∗T+1)R∗−1 + · · · + E(B∗n − A∗n)R∗−(n−T) (2)
Using forward rate parity and interest rate parity, we show in
Appendix 1 that this can be reduced to:V∗T = STVT (3)
where ST denotes the spot exchange rate at time T expressed as the
price of 1 unit of local currency in USD.7
7 The dynamics for Eq. (3) are presented in Appendix 2.
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It is important to understand that V∗T represents the expected net
alue of the economy measured in USD. This value, as shown in C&K
2011), is analogous to the market capitalization of a quoted stock.
t contains two forward looking elements. The ﬁrst is reﬂected in ST,
he spot exchange rate, through the well-known interest rate par-
ty and forward rate parity relations.8 The second forward looking
lement is reﬂected in VT, the expected net value of the economy
easured in local currency. The problem here is that only histor-
cal data in the national accounts is available to calculate V. The
istorical values, however, do contain forward looking information
hat reﬂects expectations. Businessmen use depreciation and pro-
isions for losses and obsolescence to provide for changes in the
conomic environment that might occur and affect their balance
heets. These provisions are not real losses but estimates of what
ight happen in the future. As such, they are forecasts incorpo-
ated in the ex post data and represent the link between historical
utcomes and expectations for the future.9
For the implementation of the model presented in Section 3.3.1,
e follow the procedure outlined in C&K (2011) to generate annual
stimates of the USD market value of each of our sample countries.
nowing the USD market value, we then estimate macroeconomic
roﬁts and the annual rate of return of each economy. Macroeco-
omic proﬁts are equal to exports (X*) minus imports (M*) plus net
nvestment.10 The annual rate of return on the economy is equal
o proﬁts in year T divided by the market value of the economy in
ear T − 111:
X∗T − M∗T + V∗T − V∗T−1
V∗T−1
(4)
.2. The country ﬁnancial risk premium
The country default risk premium developed in this section is
nalogous to the corporate default risk premiums developed in the
tructural models based on Merton (1974). The key argument in
his model is that on the expiry date if the value of shareholder
quity falls below the debt to be paid, the shareholder will default.
is gain is the difference between the debt payout and the value
f the equity that he loses. The situation is somewhat different for
overeign debt because international law is such that it is very difﬁ-
ult for creditors to takeover assets owned by the sovereign debtor.
owever, foreign creditors can take actions that are costly for the
overeign in terms of litigation, reduced access to export and import
nancing and ﬁnancial markets, etc. In other words the sovereign
ebtor is vulnerable through the exposure of the overall economy
o its external sector.12 Thus, if we denote ı as the proportion of the
∗otal value of the economy accruing to the external sector, ıVT is
he amount at risk (for the empirical estimation of ıV∗T , see Section
.3.2).
8 It is generally recognized that forward rates contain relevant information that
eﬂects expectations. Whether or not forward rate parity holds exactly is an unre-
olved empirical question.
9 In Appendix 3 we present a formal relationship between the ex post and ex ante
easures.
10 See Clark and Kassimatis (2011), Eqs. (8) and (4A*). Substitute the values for
 + 1 into (2) and remember that B∗
T
and A∗
T
are known (all transactions take place on
he  ﬁrst day of the period), gives V ∗
T
= B∗
T
− A∗
T
+ V ∗
T+1R
∗−1. Multiplying this by (1 + r)
nd rearranging gives proﬁts at the end of the period: r∗V ∗
T
= X∗
T
− M∗
T
+ (V ∗
T+1 − V ∗T ),
here (V ∗
T+1 − V ∗T ) represent net investment over the period.
11 Dividing proﬁts earned over the period by the net capital value of the economy
t  the beginning of the period gives the rate of return. The relevant data for most of
he macroeconomic series in this paper as well as for several other countries can be
ound at: https://countrymetrics.wordpress.com/blog/.
12 See, for example, Clark and Zenaidi (1999).ancial Stability 20 (2015) 1–13
Using ıV∗T as the underlying security, the market value of country
debt can be calculated directly:
B0 = ıV∗0N(−d1) + Ke−rtN(d2) (5)
where B is the dollar market value of the debt, t is the time to expi-
ration, r is the USD risk free rate of interest, K is the nominal dollar
amount of foreign debt outstanding and N(d) is the value of the
standardized, normal cumulative distribution evaluated at d with
d1 =
ln(ıV0/K)  + (r + (2/2))t

√
t
(6)
and
d2 =
ln(ıV0/K)  + (r − (2/2))t

√
t
(7)
Knowing the market value of the country’s foreign debt, we
calculate the risk adjusted required rate of return on this debt as
Risk-adjusted required rate of return on foreign debt
= ra = ln(K/B0)
t
(8)
The risk-adjusted required rate of return on foreign debt is the
yield that equates the present value of nominal debt with its market
value. The ﬁnancial risk premium for the country is the difference
between the risk-adjusted cost of debt (ra) and the risk free USD
rate: ra − r.13
3.3. Variable estimation
3.3.1. Market value and the economy’s rate of return
For the individual countries, the capital stock in local currency is
equal to VT =
∑T−1
t=0 (V
∗
t+1 − V∗t ). It is constructed using the standard
perpetual inventory methodology (PIM) from time series data (see:
OECD, Measuring Capital, 2001, for details of the PIM methodol-
ogy). Brieﬂy, starting with historical data on gross investment in
local currency, including gross ﬁxed capital formation and change
in stocks, depreciation was subtracted to obtain net investment
over the period. This net investment was  then added to the value
of the economy in local currency outstanding at the beginning of
the period to obtain the value of the economy outstanding at the
end of the period.14 We  compute the initial capital stock from time
0 until the period preceding the ﬁrst available data point from the
following regression:
Proﬁtst = Xt − Mt + (Vt − Vt−1) = c + rˆVt + ut (9)
where Proﬁts are estimated as in footnote 9, c is a constant repre-
senting proﬁts generated with the capital outstanding at the end
of time 0, the period preceding the ﬁrst year of the sample period,
rˆ represents the estimated return for the sample period and ut is
a random error. If we capitalize the constant from Eq. (9), i.e. c/rˆ,
we obtain the capital value of the country outstanding at the end
of year 0. For the regression we use 10 years in order to capture
a complete trade cycle.15 The capital value in local currency at the
end of year 1 is equal to the capital value at the end of year 0 plus the
13 To make the premium comparable to the yield spread, we discretize the risk
premium.
14 This application of PIM is similar to that outlined in Kraay et al. (2005), Caselli
and  Feyrer (2007), in their estimation of the amount of the world capital stock, use
an  alternative application of PIM.
15 As a practical matter, the effect of the capital outstanding in time on country
returns disappears after a maximum of 10 years in all cases. For countries with very
high  inﬂation it can disappear in two or three years. The constants in this study were
calculated for 1965, well before the test period. Thus, estimation errors have little
or  no effect on our results.
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Table  1
Average market values and GDP for sample countries and the US.
The second column of the table reports the average market value estimated as dis-
cussed in Section 3.1, from 1995 to 2010 for each national economy in billions of
US$. We  also report the estimated market value of the US for comparison. The third
column reports for each country the average market value from 1995 to 2010 as
a  percentage of the average market value of the US economy. The fourth column
reports for each country the average GDP for the same period as a percentage of the
average US GDP. Both market values and GDP are in current values (not deﬂated).
Average
market values
(in billion US$)
Average
MV/average US
MV  (in %)
Average
GDP/average
US GDP (in %)
Argentina 254.8 1.45 2.25
Brazil 778.9 4.43 8.76
Chile 146.5 0.83 1.00
China 4396.4 25.0 20.3
Colombia 138.7 0.79 1.28
Cote D’ Ivoire 14.1 0.08 0.14
Dominican Rep. 24.5 0.14 0.26
Ecuador 29.1 0.17 0.29
Egypt 112.7 0.64 0.97
El Salvador 17.1 0.10 0.14
Hungary 110.9 0.63 0.76
Indonesia 331.4 1.88 2.66
Mexico 694.8 3.95 6.23
Nigeria 35.5 0.20 0.83
Pakistan 83.0 0.47 0.90
Peru 90.7 0.52 0.71
Philippines 136.3 0.77 0.97
Poland 316.4 1.80 2.43
South Africa 203.4 1.16 1.78
Turkey 270.0 1.54 3.48
Uruguay 16.2 0.09 0.20
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(Venezuela 112.9 0.64 1.43
USA  17587.6
et investment in local currency for year 1, where net investment
s equal to gross ﬁxed capital formation plus change in inventories
ess depreciation and provision for loss and obsolescence. For year
, V is equal to capital value outstanding at the end of year 1 plus the
et investment for year 2 and so on. The value of the economy in
urrent USD was obtained by implementing Eq. (3) and multiplying
y the end of period exchange rate.
The second column of Table 1 reports average market values per
ountry for the period 1995–2010. For comparison we also report
he average market value for the US during the same period. To
ssess the plausibility of these estimates, the next two columns
eport the ratio of the average market value per country over the
verage US market value, and the average GDP per country over the
verage US GDP for the sample period. Although market value and
DP are not directly comparable because market value is a stock
easure where GDP is a ﬂow measure, the two are related because
DP is a function of the country’s productive capacity. The ﬁgures
eported in Table 1 suggest that the procedure we follow produces
lausible estimates of the value of each economy.
To calculate the economy’s rate of return (RT) we apply Eq. (4).
escriptive statistics of this variable are reported in Table 4.
.3.2. Financial risk premium
Next, we estimate the ﬁnancial risk premium. From Eqs. (5)–(8),
stimating the ﬁnancial risk premium for each country for each year
equires estimates of ıV*, the economy’s volatility, and the values
f K and t.
The proportion of the total value of the economy accruing to the
xternal sector, ıV*, is found by multiplying V* by the percentage
f imports in GDP.16 The economy’s volatility is estimated as the
16 An alternative value for ı, which gives similar results, is the percentage of
imports + exports)/2 in GDP.ancial Stability 20 (2015) 1–13 5
standard deviation of the log returns of the economy measured over
an 18 year rolling window.17 For example, the rolling window for
1995 runs from 1977 to 1994; for 1996, from 1978 to 1995; etc.
Total outstanding country debt is composed of many differ-
ent coupons, maturities and amortization schedules. To make the
debt data consistent with its application in the options pricing for-
mula, we deﬁne K, the economy’s total nominal foreign debt, as
the sum of the principal repayments plus the sum of the interest
payments over the life of all outstanding debt. Projections of the
principal and interest payments for our sample countries are avail-
able in “Global Development Finance Country Tables” (formerly
World Debt Tables).
Since we are dealing with a series of discrete payments rather
than a zero coupon bond, we also have to estimate the maturity of
the debt. This can be calculated as its risk neutral duration using
the following formula:
K e−rt =
n∑
T=1
CFT e−rT (10)
where K is the total nominal value of outstanding debt including
principal and interest, t is its maturity, r is the continuously com-
pounded USD risk free rate of interest and CFT is the debt service
payment (interest plus principal) for each year. We then solve Eq.
(10) for t to ﬁnd the debt’s risk neutral duration. This gives:
t = ln(K/
∑n
T=1CFT e
−rT )
r
(11)
Choosing the appropriate risk free rate is a problem. Ideally, each
cash ﬂow should be discounted at the spot rate corresponding to its
maturity. Unfortunately, US government instruments of this type
are only available for a limited number of maturities. Thus, a more
practical estimate of the risk-free rate would be the yield to matu-
rity on a government bond whose cash ﬂow proﬁle mimics that
of the country’s debt service (i.e., the percent of total payments
period by period is the same for both). In this case the value of t (the
risk neutral duration) for the country’s debt would be the same as
the bond’s duration. As a practical matter, we have found that the
annual average yield to maturity on a US government 10-year con-
stant maturity is a reliable proxy whose yield to maturity reﬂects
the relevant term structure over its life. Thus, when implementing
Eqs. (5) and (10), we  use this yield.
Next we provide some information about our estimates of the
ﬁnancial risk premium. The 2nd and 3rd columns of Table 2 report
the average median December spread and its standard deviation,
while the 4th and 5th columns of the table report the average ﬁnan-
cial risk premium (FP) for each country and its standard deviation.
Note that these two  are not directly comparable because FP refers
to all the foreign debt of each country, both sovereign and pri-
vate and only considers credit risk. MD,  on the other hand, is the
actual spread on selected US denominated debt and incorporates
all sources of risk.
3.3.3. The correlation coefﬁcient between returns to the economy
and the exchange rate
Galai and Wiener (2012) have argued that in a multicurrency
environment, a company wishing to minimize the probability of
insolvency (and thus the costs of ﬁnancing) should elect to ﬁnance
activities in its own currency and, where this is not possible, in a
currency that is highly correlated with the company’s rate of return.
This ﬁnancing is ex ante cheaper because it results in a lower proba-
bility of default. It also demonstrates the negative consequences of
17 Eighteen years guarantees at least one and possibly two trade cycles but is not
so  long that the earliest observations are no longer relevant.
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Table 2
Statistics for the median spread in December and the ﬁnancial risk premium at the
end of each year for each country in our sample.
MD  is the median December yield spread on US denominated debt reported by
JP  Morgan’s EMBI database. FP is the ﬁnancial risk premium at the end of year.
The  ﬁnancial risk premium is the difference between the risk adjusted cost of debt
estimated using Merton’s structural model and the risk free rate (see Section 3.2).
MD  FP
Average St. dev Average St. dev
Argentina 13.60% 14.02% 30.63% 11.42%
Brazil 5.28% 3.22% 35.09% 12.30%
Chile 1.49% 0.74% 4.43% 3.69%
China 1.15% 0.50% 0.09% 0.16%
Colombia 4.00% 2.04% 15.33% 9.58%
Cote D’ Ivoire 22.87% 8.21% 11.38% 6.18%
Dominican Rep. 6.45% 5.07% 4.16% 1.74%
Ecuador 11.96% 10.26% 15.24% 9.46%
Egypt 1.72% 1.29% 1.78% 2.35%
El  Salvador 3.32% 2.24% 1.91% 1.07%
Hungary 0.65% 0.36% 0.10% 0.11%
Indonesia 3.12% 2.26% 5.77% 1.25%
Mexico 2.55% 1.07% 8.45% 9.70%
Nigeria 5.79% 3.53% 22.93% 7.22%
Pakistan 5.92% 6.00% 6.74% 3.51%
Peru  3.76% 2.07% 15.10% 10.02%
Philippines 3.71% 1.58% 2.97% 1.53%
Poland 1.28% 0.88% 10.99% 9.57%
South Africa 2.60% 1.73% 1.10% 1.68%
Turkey 4.18% 2.21% 27.86% 12.87%
o
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SUruguay 4.64% 3.52% 20.96% 14.27%
Venezuela 7.40% 4.18% 21.57% 8.12%
verusing loans denominated in currencies negatively correlated
ith the company’s returns. This argument also applies to a coun-
ry. Thus, we generate this variable by calculating the correlation
oefﬁcient between returns to the economy (RT) and the percent-
ge change in the exchange rate using a rolling window of ten years
f historical data. The descriptive statistics are reported in Table 4.
. Choice of variables, methodology and data descriptionOur sample consists of 22 emerging markets listed in Table 3
nd includes all the emerging economies for which we have the
equired data. Including as many economies as possible in our sam-
le increases the number of observations for statistical inference
able 3
ample countries and data availability for each country.
Country Period No. of observations
Argentina 1995–2010 16
Brazil 1995–2010 16
Chile 2000–2010 11
China 1995–2010 16
Colombia 1998–2010 13
Cote D’ Ivoire 1999–2007 9
Dominican Republic 2002–2010 9
Ecuador 1996–2010 15
Egypt 2002–2010 9
El  Salvador 2003–2010 8
Hungary 2000–2004 5
Indonesia 2005–2010 6
Mexico 1995–2010 16
Nigeria 1995–2006 12
Pakistan 2002–2010 9
Peru 1998–2010 13
Philippines 1998–2010 13
Poland 2001–2008 8
South Africa 1997–2010 14
Turkey 1997–2010 14
Uruguay 2002–2010 9
Venezuela 1995–2010 16
Sum 257ancial Stability 20 (2015) 1–13
and acts as a robustness test for our results. The maximum sample
period per country is 1995–2010, depending on data availability.18
Table 3 also reports the years for which we  have data for each
country. We  use annual observations for our analysis and the
total number of observations is 257. The dependent variable is the
median December yield spread on US denominated debt reported
by JP Morgan’s EMBI database, which makes our results compa-
rable with those of Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010). One important
difference is that our sample includes the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis.
The new, forward-looking explanatory variables developed in
the preceding sections are:
- The market value of each economy annually (MV) and the change
in the market value of the economy (DMV).
- The returns to each economy (RT).
- The correlation coefﬁcient between returns to the economy and
the exchange rate, (CO) described above, is the proxy for currency
mismatches.
- The ﬁnancial risk premium (FP).
- The risk neutral duration of all external debt (DU) as in Eq. (10)
to account for time to maturity.
Based on the discussion developed in the preceding sections,
we expect MV  (DMV), RT, and CO to be negatively correlated with
spreads. We  expect a positive correlation for FP. We  have no prior
on the sign of DU. In the literature on sovereign debt, a longer matu-
rity is considered as a signal of higher debt quality. However, in the
Merton (1974) model developed above, the effect of DU (noted as
t in Eq. (5)) on the theoretical spread can be positive or negative
depending on the ratio of the market value of the economy to the
amount of debt outstanding and the volatility of the market value
of the economy.19
Table 4 reports the basic statistics for the credit spreads and the
new variables developed in this paper. It is evident from Table 4 that
our sample includes a diverse group of economies. Spreads range
from 0.003 to 0.457 with a standard deviation of 0.07, showing that
the risk proﬁle of the economies we  consider varies considerably.
This diversity is reﬂected in the new explanatory variables as well.
DMV has a mean of 74.2, a standard deviation (SD) of 249.45, a
maximum of 2310.1 and a minimum of −255.8. RT ranges from
−0.67 to 1.806 with a mean of 0.21 and an SD of 0.279 while CO
goes from −0.998 to 0.905 with a mean of −0.015 and an SD of
0.42. FP has a minimum of 0.00, a maximum of 0.506, a mean of
0.135 and an SD of 0.134. Only debt maturity (DU) shows relatively
low levels of range and volatility. Most maturities are medium term,
ranging from 2.4 to 8.4 years with an average of 5.39 and an SD of
1.31.
In the literature review of Section 2 we  identiﬁed a wide range
of local and global control variables that have been used in previ-
ous studies. The local variables include GDP growth, terms of trade,
current account (trade) balance, inﬂation, Debt/GDP, Reserves/GDP,
political risk, default history, and time to maturity. The global vari-
ables include the VIX index, the long term US treasury bond yield,
the corporate bond default yield spread, and the TED spread. In the
empirical testing that follows, we  use all these variables as con-
trol factors except the current account balance and inﬂation. We
exclude the current account balance because it is already included
directly as a component of macroeconomic proﬁts and because it
has an ambiguous effect on spreads when it stands alone (see Sec-
tion 2). We  exclude inﬂation ﬁrst, because its effect on economic
18 We use a large number of variables to construct our variables and some of them
are  not available for the whole sample period.
19 See Cox and Rubenstein (1985, p. 383).
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Table  4
Descriptive statistics.
The variables reported in the table are the following: MD:  median December yield spread on US denominated debt reported by JP Morgan’s EMBI database. DMV: change in
market  value of the economy estimated as discussed in Section 3.1. RT: returns to each economy calculated as macroeconomic proﬁts over the year divided by market value
of  the previous year (see Section 3.1). CO: correlation coefﬁcient between returns to the economy (variable RT) and the exchange rate using ten years of historical data. FP:
ﬁnancial  risk premium (see Section 3.2). DU: estimated duration of all external debt (see Section 3.3).
MD  DMV  RT CO FP DU
Mean 0.056 74.230 0.208 −0.015 0.135 5.392
Median 0.032 13.304 0.178 0.000 0.080 5.375
Maximum 0.457 2310.1 1.806 0.905 0.506 8.376
Minimum 0.003 −255.76 −0.670 −0.998 0.000 2.401
Std.  dev. 0.070 249.45 0.279 0.420 0.134 1.311
Skewness 3.044 6.100 1.853 −0.407 0.880 −0.016
Kurtosis 13.456 45.479 11.984 2.630 2.711 2.519
Observations 257 257 257 257 257 257
Table 5
List of control variables.
Local variables
- The change in real GDP (DGDPR).
- Terms of trade (TT) and the change in the terms of trade (DTT)
-  Debt over GDP (DG)
- Reserves over GDP (RG)
- Years since last default (DF) to account for default history. For this
variable, we  follow Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010) and cap the
variable at 11.
- The September country rankings published by Institutional
Investor (II) to measure political risk. To make the rankings series
compatible with the assumptions of the linear regression model,
we  use the logistic transformation of the rankings (Cosset and Roy,
1991).
Global variables
- The VIX index (VIX).
- The median US 10 year Treasury benchmark bond yield for
December of each year (US10Y) to account for the yield on the
long term treasury bond.
- The default yield spread (DYS) calculated as the difference between
the  median Barclays US BAA yield for December and the median
Barclays US AAA yield for December.
-  The median TED spread for December; i.e. the spread between the
3-month T-bill rate and the 3-month interbank rate (TED).
p
b
i
b
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n
Table 7
Regressions of future economic activity variables on economic market value and the
ﬁnancial risk premium.
The table reports regressions of future economic activity variables on the ﬁnancial
risk  premium (FR), the change in the ﬁnancial risk premium (DFP), market value of
the  economy (MV) and the change in the market value (DMV). The economic activity
variables are the change in GDP (DGDP), real gross ﬁxed capital formation (GFCF)
and  the change in foreign direct investment (DFDI). For the estimation we employ
OLS  and adjust standard errors using the Newey–West estimator. For the countries
included in the sample and the sample period for each county, see Table 3.
DGDPt+1 GFCFt+1 DFDIt+1
a −9.245 (1.32) 0.197*** (27.36) −1.226** (−2.33)
FPt 0.250 (0.55) −0.112***(−3.35) 2.987 (1.23)
DFPt −1.724(−1.55) 0.039 (0.44) −19.008**(−2.37)
MVt 0.100***(19.85) 0.0003*** (6.11) 0.005*** (6.82)
DMVt 37.726 (1.63) 0.054*** (2.89) 0.823 (0.41)
Obs.  257 257 257
R2-adj. 0.81 0.49 0.44
at the end of year t, RTt is returns to the economy calculated as
macroeconomic proﬁts over year t divided by market value of the
T
P
T
m
o
e
l
rerformance is directly reﬂected in the exchange rate, and, second,
ecause it has an ambiguous effect on spreads when it stands alone.
Table 5 presents the list of local and global control variables used
n the empirical testing. Table 6 presents the correlation coefﬁcients
etween the variables used in the regressions. From this table we
an see that except for RT and DMV  multicollinearity is generally
ot a problem in our sample.
able 6
earson correlations between local variables.
he variables reported in the table are the following: MD:  median December yield spread
arket  value of the economy estimated as discussed in Section 3.1; RT: returns to each ec
f  the previous year (see Section 3.1); CO: correlation coefﬁcient between returns to the e
stimated duration of all external debt (see Section 3.3); FP: ﬁnancial risk premium (see
ast  default and capped at 11; II: the logistic transformation of the September country ran
eal  GDP.
MD DMV  RT CO DU 
DMV  −0.182
RT −0.126 0.873
CO −0.152 −0.175 −0.188
DU 0.227 −0.287 −0.293 0.183
FP  0.294 −0.203 −0.195 −0.200 −0.025
DG 0.543 −0.323 −0.251 −0.150 0.311 
RG  −0.262 0.599 0.629 −0.133 −0.001 
DF  −0.475 0.180 0.134 −0.111 −0.278 
II  −0.568 0.391 0.311 −0.041 −0.537 
TT  0.048 −0.114 −0.141 0.101 −0.096 
DGDPR 0.161 −0.611 −0.675 0.091 0.246 ** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
To assess the effect of the variables we construct on spreads, we
estimate the following model:
MDt = a + b1DMVt + b2FPt + b3RTt + b4COt + b5DUt + biXt + et
(12)
where MDt is the median December yield spread on US denom-
inated debt reported by JP, DMVt is the change in market value
of the economy during year t, FPt is the ﬁnancial risk premiumprevious year, COt is the correlation coefﬁcient between returns to
the economy (variable RT) and the exchange rate using ten years
 on US denominated debt reported by JP Morgan’s EMBI database; DMV: change in
onomy calculated as macroeconomic proﬁts over the year divided by market value
conomy (variable RT) and the exchange rate using ten years of historical data; DU:
 Section 3.2); DG: external debt over GDP; RG: reserves over GDP; DF: years since
kings published by Institutional Investor; TT: terms of trade; DGDP: the change in
FP DG RG DF II TT
0.382
−0.251 −0.094
−0.220 −0.334 0.099
−0.482 −0.580 0.310 0.630
−0.149 −0.227 −0.011 −0.026 0.205
0.254 0.311 −0.414 −0.176 −0.294 0.095
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Table 8
Regressions of spreads on local and global factors.
The dependent variable is the median December yield spread on US denominated debt reported by JP Morgan’s EMBI database for a number of countries. All regressions are
estimated with feasible GLS, which corrects for cross-section heteroscedasticity. The sample period is 1995–2010. The independent variables are: DMV: change in market
value  of the economy estimated as discussed in Section 3.1. RT: returns to each economy calculated as macroeconomic proﬁts over the year divided by market value of
the  previous year (see Section 3.1), CO: correlation coefﬁcient between returns to the economy (variable RT) and the exchange rate using ten years of historical data, DU:
estimated duration of all external debt (see Section 3.3), FP: ﬁnancial risk premium (see Section 3.2), DG: external debt over GDP, RG: reserves over GDP, DF: years since last
default and capped at 11, II: the logistic transformation of the September country rankings published by Institutional Investor, TT: terms of trade, DTT: change in the terms
of  trade, DGDP: change in real GDP, US10Y: the median US 10 year Treasury benchmark bond yield for December of each year, TED: the median TED spread for December;
i.e.  the spread between the 3-month T-bill rate and the 3-month interbank rate, VIX: the VIX index, DYS: the default yield spread calculated as the difference between the
median Barclays US BAA yield for December and the median Barclays US AAA yield for December. Figures in parentheses are t-ratios.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
C 0.007
(0.97)
−0.003
(−0.67)
0.004
(0.21)
0.027*
(1.83)
0.020
(1.00)
0.012
(1.14)
0.021
(1.81)
DMV  −0.0002***
(−4.53)
−0.00003
(−0.77)
RT −0.013**
(−1.97)
−0.025***
(−4.54)
−0.019***
(−3.21)
−0.013**
(−2.29)
−0.018***
(−3.03)
−0.013**
(−2.28)
CO  −0.019***
(−4.23)
−0.005*
(−1.64)
−0.007***
(−2.62)
−0.006**
(−2.06)
−0.008***
(−3.00)
−0.006**
(−2.07)
FP  0.114***
(9.90)
0.040**
(2.41)
0.044**
(2.05)
0.029**
(1.97)
0.045**
(2.13)
DU  0.007***
(5.26)
0.006***
(5.58)
−0.0004
(−0.39)
0.0004
(0.25)
DGDP 0.019***
(3.93)
0.017***
(3.46)
0.002
(0.32)
TT 0.0002***
(3.11)
0.0002***
(2.83)
0.0002**
(2.50)
0.0003***
(3.68)
0.0002**
(2.51)
DTT  −0.0001***
(−0.81)
−0.0008
(−0.56)
−0.0003
(−0.25)
DG 0.055***
(4.95)
0.049***
(4.63)
0.057***
(3.96)
0.035***
(4.19)
0.055***
(3.88)
RG  −0.123***
(−5.48)
−0.104***
(−5.10)
−0.051**
(−2.01)
−0.089***
(−4.35)
−0.049**
(−2.31)
DF  −0.002**
(−2.31)
−0.002***
(−2.93)
−0.0002
(−0.19)
II  −0.033***
(−11.80)
−0.029***
(−6.59)
−0.022***
(−2.61)
−0.035***
(−11.20)
−0.020***
(−2.91)
VIX  0.0007*
(1.76)
0.0007**
(2.33)
0.0008**
(2.56)
0.001***
(7.79)
0.001***
(8.73)
US10Y −0.200
(−0.85)
−0.458***
(−2.78)
−0.703***
(−3.54)
−0.615***
(−4.62)
−0.714***
(−4.91)
DYS  0.462
(1.30)
0.247
(0.95)
0.115
(0.42)
TED 0.479*
(1.68)
0.611**
(2.56)
0.203
(0.68)
Fixed effects No No No No Yes No Yes
Fixed  effects F
test
8.28*** 10.18***
Obs. 257 257 257 257 257 257 257
R2-adj. 0.19 0.41 0.56 0.66 0.75 0.66 0.78
* Statistical signiﬁcance at 10% level.
o
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v** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
f historical data, DUt is the estimated duration of all external debt
nd Xt is a vector of local and global control variables, reported in
able 5.
Since our sample represents a diverse collection of emerg-
ng countries, at various stages of development with differing
tructures and characteristics, heteroskedasticity is a concern.
o account for this the model is estimated using feasible gen-
ralized least squares (FGLS), which corrects for cross-section
eteroscedasticity.2020 Under the assumption that the disturbances have different variances for each
anel and are constant within panels, FGLS is asymptotically efﬁcient. Assuming
hat the volatility of bond spreads does not change substantially over time but is
ariable across countries is conﬁrmed by Wald test results of the residuals.5. Results
5.1. Preliminary tests
If the variables we  construct are indeed forward-looking and
affect future spreads, they should also be related to future eco-
nomic activity.21 In this section we  test this proposition. The main
variables in our analysis are the market value of an economy and
the ﬁnancial risk premium so, we  test if these variables can explain
future economic activity measured by the change in GDP, real gross
ﬁxed capital formation as a percentage of GDP and the change in
FDI. Improved economic conditions should result in higher GDP,
higher levels of investment and increased capital inﬂows. Thus,
the macroeconomic market value should have a positive impact on
GDP, investment and FDI while the ﬁnancial risk premium should
21 We thank an anonymous referee for raising this point.
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Table 9
Regressions of spreads on local and global factors using winsorized series.
The dependent variable is the median December yield spread on US denomi-
nated debt reported by JP Morgan’s EMBI database for a number of countries. All
regressions are estimated with feasible GLS, which corrects for cross-section het-
eroscedasticity. The sample period is 1995–2010. The independent variables are:
DMV: change in market value of the economy estimated as discussed in Section
3.1. RT: returns to each economy calculated as macroeconomic proﬁts over the year
divided by market value of the previous year (see Section 3.1), CO: correlation coef-
ﬁcient between returns to the economy (variable RT) and the exchange rate using
ten years of historical data, DU: estimated duration of all external debt (see Section
3.3), FP: ﬁnancial risk premium (see Section 3.2), DG: external debt over GDP, RG:
reserves over GDP, II: the logistic transformation of the September country rank-
ings published by Institutional Investor, TT: terms of trade, US10Y: the median US
10  year Treasury benchmark bond yield for December of each year and VIX: the VIX
index. Figures in parentheses are t-ratios.
Winsorized
variable
FP DMV  FP
(1) (2) (3)
C −0.004
(−0.65)
−0.003
(−0.55)
0.021*
(1.82)
DMV  −0.00003
(−0.78)
−0.00004
(−0.89)
RT −0.025***
(−4.52)
−0.025***
(−4.46)
−0.013**
(−2.26)
CO −0.005*
(−1.64)
−0.006*
(−1.70)
−0.006**
(−2.10)
FP 0.114***
(9.94)
0.113***
(9.74)
0.043**
(2.03)
DU  0.006***
(5.56)
0.006***
(5.42)
TT 0.0002**
(2.52)
DG  0.055***
(3.89)
RG  −0.049**
(−2.31)
II −0.020***
(−2.95)
VIX 0.001***
(8.74)
US10Y −0.714***
(−4.91)
Obs. 257 257 257
R2-adj. 0.41 0.41 0.78
* Statistical signiﬁcance at 10% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
***E. Clark, K. Kassimatis / Journal
ave a negative impact on these variables. To test this hypothesis
e run the following regressions:
GDPt+1 = a + bFPt + cDFPt + dMVt + fDMVt + et (13a)
FCFt+1 = a + bFPt + cDFPt + dMVt + fDMVt + et (13b)
FDIt+1 = a + bFPt + cDFPt + dMVt + fDMVt + et (13c)
here DGDPt+1 is the change in GDP from year t to year t + 1, GFCFt+1
s real gross ﬁxed capital formation in year t + 1, DFDIt+1 is the
hange in foreign direct investment from year t to year t + 1, FPt
nd DFPt are the ﬁnancial risk premium in year t and the change in
he ﬁnancial risk premium from year t − 1 to year t respectively, and
Vt and DMVt are the market value of an economy in year t and the
hange in the market value of an economy from year t − 1 to year t.
ll variables are expressed in US dollars. For the estimation we stack
he data and estimate the regression using OLS. Standard errors are
djusted for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity with the use
f the Newey–West estimator. The results are reported in Table 7.
In all three equations, our variables can explain a substantial
art of future economic activity. In the ﬁrst equation, only MV  is
tatistically signiﬁcant with a t-ratio of 19.85 and can explain 81%
f the future change in GDP. This is hardly surprising. GDP repre-
ents the income of an economy. This income is generated from
he capital stock of this economy which is measured by MV.  So,
s long as MV  can measure the value of the capital stock of an
conomy with a certain degree of accuracy, it is natural to ﬁnd
uch a strong relationship between the value of the capital stock
n year t and the income generated from this capital stock in year
 + 1. Considering that GDP is not included directly or indirectly in
he calculation of any of the independent variables, this is clear
vidence that our variables are relevant in explaining future eco-
omic activity. The second and third columns of the table provide
urther evidence that both FP and MV  are signiﬁcant predictors of
 country’s future economic activity. Overall, the results reported
n the table are evidence that the variables we construct are indeed
elated to future economic activity and as such, they should also be
elated to sovereign spreads.
.2. In sample tests
The independent variables in column (1) of Table 8 are those
erived from the model developed in Section 3, except for the
nancial risk premium. They can explain 19% of the variation in
preads. In column (2) we include the ﬁnancial risk premium, noted
P. While most of the variables used to construct FP are already
ncluded in the regression of column (1) directly or indirectly, we
nd that including FP more than doubles the explanatory power of
he model. This is evidence supporting the structural models found
n the literature and suggests that they provide incremental infor-
ation with respect to the individual variables used to estimate
hem. Including FP in the regression renders DMV  insigniﬁcant and
ropping it from the regression has no effect on the explanatory
ower of the model.22
Column 3 reports the regression where we use only variables
ited in the literature as important determinants of spreads. Follow-
ng Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010), the global variables we include
re the VIX index, the 10-year US Treasury note yield, the TED
pread and the US default yield spread. The results we  report in
olumn (3) are similar to the results reported by Hilscher and
osbusch (2010). Adding our variables (column 4) increases the
djusted R2 of the regression from 56% to 66%, which is further
22 In the context of our analysis, insigniﬁcant variables are dropped mainly to avoid
roblems of multicollinearity. In column 4 of Table 8 we  include 11 local variables
n  the regression so, multicollinearity could be a concern.Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
evidence of the incremental information generated by the forward
looking variables in Section 3.
Beck (2001) argues that long term structural variables which
determine spreads can be captured by country speciﬁc intercepts
using ﬁxed effects estimation. Using ﬁxed effects (column 5) also
serves as a robustness test for the results reported in column 4. The
results in columns 4 and 5 suggest that DU, DF,  DTT, DGDP, TED and
DYS are statistically insigniﬁcant. The use of ﬁxed effects is strongly
supported by an F-test reported at the bottom of the table. A 2 test
for the joint signiﬁcance of the statistically insigniﬁcant variables
does not reject the null of no signiﬁcance with a probability of 99%.
Dropping them in columns 6 and 7 gives an adjusted R2 of 66% and
78% without and with ﬁxed effects respectively.23
The conclusion is that the variables RT (return to the economy),
CO (the correlation coefﬁcient between returns to the economy and
the exchange rate) and FP (the ﬁnancial risk premium developed in
Section 3) are signiﬁcant determinants of the sovereign risk spread
that improve the explanatory power of the other models proposed
23 We dropped these variables one at a time to see if that affects the signiﬁcance
of  the others. It didn’t.
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Table 10
Regressions of out-of-sample spreads on local and global factors.
The  dependent variable is the out-of-sample median spread for the month reported in the second row of the table; for example, the dependent variable for the results reported
in  the 2nd column is the median January spread for each country and the independent variables refer to the end of the previous year. All regressions are estimated with
feasible GLS, which corrects for cross-section heteroscedasticity. The sample period is 1995–2010. The independent variables are: RT: returns to each economy calculated as
macroeconomic proﬁts over the year divided by market value of the previous year (see Section 3.1), CO: correlation coefﬁcient between returns to the economy (variable RT)
and  the exchange rate using ten years of historical data, FP: ﬁnancial risk premium (see Section 3.2), TT: terms of trade, DG: external debt over GDP, RG: reserves over GDP,
II:  the logistic transformation of the September country rankings published by Institutional Investor, VIX: the VIX index, US10Y: the median US 10 year Treasury benchmark
bond  yield for December of each year. Figures in parentheses are t-ratios.
Local variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
January February March April May  June
c 0.025**
(2.14)
0.022*
(1.86)
0.026**
(2.19)
0.019*
(1.76)
0.019*
(1.78)
0.024**
(2.33)
RT  −0.014***
(−2.71)
−0.015***
(−3.15)
−0.014***
(−2.62)
−0.012***
(−2.62)
−0.014**
(−2.58)
−0.017***
(−3.16)
CO  −0.008**
(−2.49)
−0.009***
(−3.06)
−0.007**
(−2.46)
−0.009***
(3.19)
−0.011***
(−3.32)
−0.011***
(−3.81)
FP  0.035**
(1.97)
0.051***
(2.63)
0.030
(1.42)
0.038**
(2.03)
0.033*
(1.73)
0.039**
(2.25)
TT  0.0002**
(2.22)
0.0002***
(2.60)
0.0002**
(2.40)
0.0001**
(2.35)
0.0002**
(2.58)
0.0001**
(2.17)
DG  0.041***
(3.38)
0.043***
(3.37)
0.054***
(3.54)
0.045***
(4.61)
0.043***
(4.10)
0.030***
(3.37)
RG  −0.051**
(−2.39)
−0.045**
(−2.15)
−0.045**
(−2.23)
−0.059***
(−2.96)
−0.045**
(−2.25)
−0.044**
(−2.29)
II  −0.018***
(−2.85)
−0.016**
(−2.52)
−0.013*
(−1.92)
−0.008
(−1.40)
−0.011*
(−1.73)
−0.009
(−1.51)
VIX  0.001***
(10.26)
0.0009***
(10.02)
0.0008***
(8.68)
0.0007***
(8.79)
0.0005***
(6.78)
0.0004***
(5.49)
US10Y −0.543***
(−4.32)
−0.577***
(−4.75)
−0.664***
(−4.76)
−0.308**
(−2.30)
−0.264*
(−1.80)
−0.129
(−0.94)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed  effects F
test
10.99*** 10.44*** 13.44*** 12.18*** 11.81*** 11.67***
Obs. 257 257 257 257 257 257
R2-adj. 0.77 0.77 0.79 0.80 0.79 0.80
* Statistical signiﬁcance at 10% level.
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*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
n the literature. Since these variables are not included in the factors
ommonly used in similar studies, they contain signiﬁcant, incre-
ental information that improves our understanding of the driving
orces behind spreads. Another conclusion drawn from Table 8 is
hat studies on the determinants of sovereign risk should employ
nformation derived from structural models as well as fundamental
ocal and global variables.
.3. The effect of outliers
As a ﬁrst robustness test, we re-estimate our model controlling
or outliers. Speciﬁcally, we winsorize the 1% highest and 1% lowest
alues of the ﬁnancial risk premium and the change in market value
nd re-estimate.24 The results are reported in Table 9. In the ﬁrst
olumn of the table we estimate the model reported in column
 of Table 8, where we winsorize the ﬁnancial risk premium. In
he second column, we estimate the same speciﬁcation winsorizing
he change in the market value. The results in both columns are
ualitatively and quantitatively very similar to the ones reported
n Table 8, which suggests that outliers play no role in our results.
MV remains statistically insigniﬁcant at any reasonable level of
igniﬁcance so it is dropped from the model. In the last column of
he table we estimate the model reported in column 7 of Table 8,
ith FP winsorized. Again, there is no effect on the results which
uggests that outliers are not a concern for our analysis.
24 We choose to winsorize rather than to trim the sample so we do not lose obser-
ations.5.4. Out of sample tests
To further test the robustness of the results reported up to now,
we examine if the model developed in column 7 of Table 8 can
explain out-of-sample spreads. Out-of-sample testing is a way  to
verify the explanatory power of an econometric model. Different
or weaker results to those obtained in the in-sample tests call into
question the explanatory power of the model while similar results
reinforce it. Similar results are also indicators of the model’s fore-
casting power.25
In Table 10, we regress median spreads of January, February,
etc. on factors from December of the previous year. The new
macro variables, RT, CO and FP as well as several other control
variables, remain highly statistically signiﬁcant in these regres-
sions. Importantly, the results show that the model we propose
explains between 77% and 80% of spreads up to six months into
the out-of-sample period. Overall, they support the robustness of
the in-sample results reported in Table 8. Second, they conﬁrm the
Hausman test that endogeneity is not a problem. Tests (not reported
here but available on request) suggest that the explanatory power
of the model begins to drop about 7 months into the future.25 The Hausman test for endogeneity, not reported here but available on request,
suggests that endogeneity is not a problem in the model. Using out-of-sample
spreads where, by deﬁnition, all variables are lagged, is a robustness test for the
Hausman test for potential endogeneity.
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Table  11
Predictive power of macro variables.
All models are estimated using the Berndt, Hall, Hall and Hausman algorithm. The
sample period is 1995–2010. The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the
change in the spreads from December to June is greater than (i) 150 basis points,
(ii) 250 basis points, and (iii) 300 basis points. The independent variables are: DMV:
change in market value of the economy (see Section 3.1), RT: returns to economy
calculated as macroeconomic proﬁts over the year divided by market value of the
previous year (see Section 3.1), CO: correlation coefﬁcient between returns to the
economy (variable RT) and the exchange rate using ten years of historical data, FP:
ﬁnancial risk premium (see Section 3.2), DU: estimated duration of all external debt
(see Section 3.3), TT: terms of trade, DG: external debt over GDP, RG: reserves over
GDP,  II: the logistic transformation of the September country rankings published
by Institutional Investor, VIX: the VIX index, and US10Y: the median US 10 year
Treasury benchmark bond yield for December of each year. Figures in parentheses
are  t-ratios. No. of 1s is the number of cases where the dependent variable takes
the value of 1. Panel B reports the number of correct 0s and 1s estimated if the
independent variables are the control variables only.
S > 150 bps S > 250 bps S  > 300 bps
Panel A
DMV  0.0027
(1.10)
0.0099
(0.88)
0.0214
(1.49)
RT −1.4535
(−1.04)
−4.6591*
(−1.70)
−5.8996**
(−2.38)
CO −3.1146***
(−3.02)
−6.3697**
(−2.20)
−5.5594*
(−1.71)
FP 3.0385
(0.99)
10.9533**
(2.52)
12.239**
(2.29)
DU 1.6336***
(3.78)
3.6367**
(2.14)
1.6014**
(2.37)
TT 0.0076
(0.38)
−0.0008
(−0.04)
0.0294
(1.28)
DG −0.6755
(−0.41)
−0.2237
(−0.12)
−0.3285
(−0.17)
RG −23.780***
(−2.67)
−86.9779**
(−2.47)
−91.6128*
(−1.91)
II 0.8928
(1.14)
1.2380
(1.09)
−2.9038
(−0.72)
VIX 0.0014
(0.97)
−0.1119
(−1.31)
−0.0967*
(−1.67)
US10Y 82.644*
(1.93)
265.87**
(2.16)
254.84*
(1.79)
McFadden R2 0.39 0.78 0.74
Accuracy 95.3% 99.22% 99.6%
Observations 257 257 257
No. of 1s 16 8 6
Correct 0s 100% 99.6% 100%
Correct 1s 31.3% 87.5% 83.3%
Panel B: Results with control variables only
Correct 0s 100% 99.6% 99.6%
Correct 1s 0% 0% 16.7%
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Finally, the variable CO, the correlation between RT and the
exchange rate, is shown to reduce spreads and ex ante cost of
borrowing.28 Thus, a country wishing to minimize the costs of
26 The value of the economy in local currency reﬂects the internal organization of
the  economy and is analogous to the situation of the individual ﬁrm with its own set
of  resources, wages, internal transfer prices, cross subsidies, etc., which determine
the composition and quantity of its output and its inputs.
∂B* Statistical signiﬁcance at 10% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
.5. Forecasting power
As an additional robustness test on the relationship between the
ew macro variables and sovereign spreads, we  assess their fore-
asting power. We examine the predictive power of these variables
y testing if they can predict deterioration in the creditworthiness
f an economy over a period of 6 months. Speciﬁcally, we estimate
 logit model where the dependent variable takes the value of one
f the change in the spreads from December to June is greater than
i) 150 basis points, (ii) 250 basis points, and (iii) 300 basis points.
n each case, we include in the model all the control variables from
able 8 and assess the predictive power of the model with and with-
ut the new macro variables we have constructed. The results are
eported in Table 11.Except for DMV, all the other new macro variables we con-
tructed are statistically signiﬁcant in most cases and have the
orrect sign. It is worth noting that most of the control variables
re not statistically signiﬁcant in any of the equations. The mostancial Stability 20 (2015) 1–13 11
interesting result is that the predictive power of the model with
respect to sharp increases in spreads is quite high and comes almost
exclusively from the new macro variables we constructed. It pre-
dicts 100% of 0’s (changes of less than 150, 250 and 300 bps,
respectively). Most importantly, the model predicts 31.3%, 87.5%
and 83.3% of 1’s (increases greater than or equal to 150, 250 and
300 bps, respectively). The fact that the predictability improves
considerably for the larger increases in spreads (S ≥ 250, 300 bps)
is evidence of the forward-looking nature of the new macro vari-
ables and their ability to predict large, adverse moves in a country’s
economic situation, a quality much appreciated by traders and
policy-makers. As a ﬁnal test of the predictive power of the new
macro variables, we  estimate the same equations with the control
variables only. Panel B shows that without the new macro variables
the predictive power of the model virtually disappears.
6. Conclusion
This paper proposes a new set of macroeconomic factors related
to market values that reﬂect investor expectations concerning
future economic performance to explain spreads on emerging mar-
ket sovereign debt. The forward-looking variables that we  construct
are signiﬁcant and complement and enhance the explanatory con-
tent of the conventional variables found in the extant literature.
Higher expected macroeconomic returns reduce spreads while
higher ﬁnancial risk premiums increase them. Higher correlation
between the country’s rate of return and the exchange rate reduce
spreads. The overall model itself captures a signiﬁcant part of the
empirical variation in spreads, and importantly for policy makers
and market participants, it also includes a powerful forecasting
component that extends up to 6 months outside the sample period.
Our results bring up some interesting policy implications. The
ﬁrst is the importance of the rate of return (RT) on the value of
the economy measured in foreign currency (USD). Remember that
the market value of the economy in USD is analogous to the mar-
ket capitalization of a quoted stock measured as the net present
value of expected income and expenditure from time 0 to time n.26
Thus, RT reﬂects not only how effectively the economy is currently
being managed. As a forward looking variable, it also reﬂects how
the economy is expected to be managed in the future and ﬁgures
directly as a key determinant of future spreads. As such, the effect
of economic and ﬁnancial policy on the economy’s rate of return in
foreign currency should be a major policy concern.
However, it is not only the level of RT that should concern
the policy-maker. The volatility of RT should concern him as well.
Remember from Eqs. (5)–(7) that the volatility of RT is one of the
variables that determines the market value of outstanding debt.
The partial derivative of Eq. (5) with respect to the volatility of RT
is negative.27 From Eq. (8) we see that the lower bond price raises
the risk-adjusted required rate of return on foreign debt and, con-
sequently, the ﬁnancial risk premium (FP). Thus, the policy-maker
should be sensitive to policies and policy changes that cause RT to
ﬂuctuate and increase its volatility.27
∂
< 0.
28 This is, to our knowledge, the ﬁrst empirical evidence in support of Galai
and Wiener’s (2012) argument that in a multicurrency environment, a company
(country) wishing to minimize the probability of insolvency (and thus the costs of
ﬁnancing) should elect to ﬁnance activities in its own currency and, where this is
1  of Fin
ﬁ
w
w
A
s
n
V
a
d
V
p
r
d
s
r
T
i
A
m
i
v
w
t
c
m
d
d
a
t
z
r
t
E
d
w
s
n
e
i
d
m
d
forecasts incorporated in the ex post data and represent the link
between Eqs. (3A.1) and (3A.3), the ex ante and the ex post measures2 E. Clark, K. Kassimatis / Journal
nancing should elect to ﬁnance activities in its own  currency and,
here this is not possible, in a currency that is highly correlated
ith the rate of return on the economy.
ppendix 1. Expected market value and the exchange rate
Eqs. (1) and (2) in the text, reproduced here for convenience,
how the market value of an open national economy at the begin-
ing of time T in local currency:
T = (BT − AT ) + E(BT+1 − AT+1)R−1 + · · · + E(Bn − An)R−(n−T)
(1A.1)
nd the value of the economy in US dollars (USD), where asterisks
enote USD:
∗
T = (B∗T − A∗T ) + E(B∗T+1 − A∗T+1)R∗−1 + · · · + E(B∗n − A∗n)R∗−(n−T)
(1A.2)
Let St denote the spot exchange rate at time t expressed as the
rice of 1 unit of local currency in USD and FT,t the forward exchange
ate (the price of 1 unit of local currency in USD) at time T for
elivery at time t. By deﬁnition B∗t = StBt and A∗t = StAt . Make these
ubstitutions into Eq. (1A.1), take expectations and apply forward
ate parity,29 E(St) = FT,t, and interest rate parity, FT,t = ST(R*t−T/Rt−T).
hen, substituting VT from Eq. (1A.1) and simplifying gives Eq. (3)
n the text.
ppendix 2. The dynamics of the country level valuation
odel
To gain some insight into the foregoing analysis and the forces
t reﬂects, consider its dynamics. Both V and S are nominal random
ariables that cannot be negative. An inspection of the data for a
ide range of countries suggests that besides the random element
here is a trend (growth) component in their evolution as well. Pro-
esses such as these can be represented by geometric Brownian
otion
S(t) = ˇS(t)dt + ωS(t)dw(t) (2A.1)
V(t) = ˛V(t)dt + V(t)dx(t) (2A.2)
The parameters  ˛ and  ˇ reﬂect the expected growth rates of S
nd V respectively with  and ω as the respective standard devia-
ions. The variables dw and dx are standard Wiener processes with
ero mean and variance of dt.  The relationship between S and V is
eﬂected in dw(t)dx(t) = dt where  is the instantaneous correla-
ion between S and V.
From Eq. (3) let V*(t) = S(t)V(t) for any t. Using, Ito’s lemma  and
qs. (2A.1) and (2A.2) gives30
V∗(t) = (  ˛ +  ˇ + ω)V∗(t)dt +
√
ω2 + 2 + 2ω V∗(t)dz(t)
(2A.3)( )
here dz(t) = (ωdw + dx)/
√
ω2 + 2 + 2ω  . Eq. (2A.3)
hows that the evolution of the market value of the economy in
ot possible, in a currency that is highly correlated with the rate of return on the
conomy. This ﬁnancing is ex ante cheaper because it results in a lower probabil-
ty  of default. It also demonstrates the negative consequences of overusing loans
enominated in currencies negatively correlated with the returns on the economy.
29 To avoid complicating the presentation unnecessarily, we  assume no risk pre-
ium and zero correlation.
30 Since economies and exchange rates typically have no ﬁxed maturity date, V
oes not depend directly on time and, therefore, the time derivative disappears.ancial Stability 20 (2015) 1–13
USD depends on the growth rates and volatilities of the exchange
rate and the value of the economy in local currency as well as
on the correlation between the two. The growth (drift compo-
nent = (  ˛ +  ˇ + ω)) of the dollar value of the economy depends
on  ˛ and  ˇ as well as on the volatilities of S(t) and V(t) and the
correlation between them. The volatility of the dollar value of the
economy
√
ω2 + 2 + 2ω  depends on the individual volatilities
and correlation as well.
Thus, the model captures the internal dynamics of the coun-
try’s economy reﬂected in V. It also captures the dynamics of the
evaluation of V by the international markets reﬂected in S, and,
ﬁnally, it captures the interaction between the two reﬂected in the
correlation coefﬁcient.
Appendix 3. Establishing the forward looking component
of historical accounting data
To establish the link between the economy’s past performance
and the forward looking component in historical accounting data,
we start by simplifying Eq. (1), the forward looking measure of the
economy’s value. Substituting the values for T + 1 into Eq. (1) and
remembering that BT and AT are known (all transactions take place
on the ﬁrst day of the period), gives
VT = BT − AT + VT+1R−1 (3A.1)
We now look at what has been invested in the economy (the
accounting or historical value of the economy) in local currency,
compounded at the economy’s internal rate of return, denoted as
WT.31 This retrospective representation of the value of the economy
gives32:
WT = −(B0 − A0)RT − (B1 − A1)RT−1 − · · · − (BT−1 − AT−1)R (3A.2)
Substituting the value of WT+1 into Eq. (3A.2) and rearranging
gives
WT = BT − AT + WT+1R−1 (3A.3)
Eqs. (3A.1) and (3A.3) are equivalent if expectations do not
change between time 0 and time T. However, a change in expec-
tations can cause a discrepancy between the two. Things may  not
work out as planned and losses occur or things may work out bet-
ter than planned and gains occur. Capital gains or losses cause a
discrepancy between the ex post and the ex ante measures of cap-
ital. For example, a rise in the price of oil or in the interest rate
can cause serious capital losses across wide sectors of the economy.
Other things being equal, the losses would be reﬂected immediately
in the expectations of Eq. (3A.1) but not in Eq. (3A.3). In practice,
however, there is a strong link between the two. Businessmen use
depreciation and provisions for losses and obsolescence to provide
for changes in the economic environment that might occur and
affect their balance sheets. These provisions are not real losses but
estimates of what might happen in the future. As such, they areof capital in local currency.
31 As with the expected values, in order to simplify the exposition, we assume that
the real interest rate and the inﬂation rate are constant so that compounding takes
place at a constant rate.
32 The sign changes because we are looking retrospectively at what has been
invested in the economy. For example, the economy earns its internal rate of return,
so  at time 0: W0 = 0 = (B0 − A0) + (B1 − A1)R−1 + · · · + (Bn − An)R−n
It follows from the discounted cash ﬂow formula that for any T between 0 and n
W0 = 0 = (B0 − A0) + (B1 − A1)R−1 + · · · + WTR−T .
Rearranging gives Eq. (3A.2).
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